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Abstract
We set up a model of elections or referendums with two alternatives to
study how voter turnout and election outcomes are a¤ected by the publica-
tion of exit polls on election day. We nd that the introduction of an exit
poll inuences the incentive to vote both before and after the poll is pub-
lished, but the signs of the e¤ects are generally ambiguous. The fact that
exit polls inuence the incentive to vote before they are even published is
sometimes overlooked in the debate on their desirability. We show that this
can lead to premature conclusions about the impact of exit polls on election
outcomes.
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1 Introduction
On June 7 2009, Danish voters went to the polls to decide on a proposed change
to the Danish Law of Succession, the law that governs the succession to the Dan-
ish throne. The proposed change would imply that sons would no longer have
precedence over daughters in the line of succession, establishing so-called equal
primogeniture: The right of the rst-born child, whether male or female, to be
rst in line to inherit the throne.
The referendum was subject to the procedure that governs changes to the
Danish constitution. In order to pass, the proposal therefore had to overcome two
obstacles: One, a majority of the votes cast in the referendum must be in favor
of the proposal. And two, at least 40% of all eligible voters must vote in favor of
the proposal. In the weeks preceding the June 7 election, there was no doubt that
only the latter of these requirements had the potential to become binding. In a
Gallup poll released a week before the election, 84% of respondents indicated that
they approved of the proposal to change the law. However, only 40.2% responded
that they would show up at polls and vote in favor of the proposal.
On the afternoon of the election day, TV2, a major Danish TV channel, pub-
lished the results of an exit poll, which predicted that 37.9% of all eligible voters
would cast a vote in favor of the proposal to change the law. However, during
the evening the situation turned around with pollsters reporting a considerable
increase in turnout. In the end, the o¢ cial result was that 45.1% of all eligible
voters had voted in favor of the proposal, which corresponded to 85.4% of all votes
cast. Thus, the proposal passed with a comfortable margin.
The discrepancy between the early exit poll and the nal result sparked a lively
public debate in the days following the referendum. The fact that voter turnout
rose in the nal hours before the polling stations closed led some observers to
conclude that it was the publication of the exit poll itself, and the prospect of the
proposal failing, that got potential yes-voters to the polling stations. Without the
exit poll, the proposal would not have passed, the argument went.1 The Social
Democrats, the major opposition party, took the opportunity to propose that
1On June 9, the Danish newspaper Politiken ran a front page story under the headline Equal
rights in the Royal family were saved by exit poll. Professor Jørgen Elklit of Aarhus University
was quoted for saying that the prospect of a no made more people vote. A related article
from the same day brought the following quote from Professor Johannes Andersen of Aalborg
University: It appears that 5 percent of voters changed their behavior in the last hours. They
would not have voted if they had not been made aware that votes were lacking. (Sofavælgere
piskede til valgstederne, Politiken, June 9 2009).
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Denmark follow a number of other countries in prohibiting the publication of exit
polls before polling stations are closed.2
In this paper we present a theoretical model to analyze whether and how exit
polls inuence voter turnout and outcomes in referendums or elections with two
alternatives. We assume that voting takes place over two stages. Voters can
choose to vote in either stage, or to abstain. Before stage two, an exit poll reveals
how voters voted in the rst stage. Any remaining potential voters then use this
information to rene their decision rule for stage two.
The basic set-up in our model follows the seminal contributions of Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1983), and especially Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Voters face
heterogeneous costs of participating in the referendum. Costs are net of any direct
benets of participating (e.g., from fulllment of "civic duty") and may thus be
positive or negative. Each voter knows her own cost, but has only probabilistic
knowledge about otherscosts. Thus, when the exit poll reveals all early votes
it provides a remaining potential voter with information about, loosely speaking,
how close the race is. But it also allows her to update her beliefs about the realized
costs of the other remaining voters, i.e., those that did not vote early.
We restrict attention to referendums in which the outcome is determined not
only by simple majority; one of the alternatives, typically a proposal to change
a status quo, must also receive a certain number of votes in order to beat the
other.3 Moreover, we simplify our model by assuming that all voters prefer the
same alternative. This may appear overly restrictive, but it closely mimicks the
situation in the Danish referendum in 2009: Since more than 80% of voters were in
favor of changing the law, it was clear that the proposal would pass if and only if at
least 40% of the electorate voted for it. In that case, the opponents of the proposal
would have no chance of getting a majority against it. This e¤ectively made their
participation decision irrelevant for the outcome of the referendum. Our simple
model can also be seen as a building block that can be used in models of exit
polls in more general electoral settings. For example, suppose that there are two
alternatives and the electoral rule is simple majority. Then the supporters of each
alternative are facing a problem that is similar to the one in our model: Taking
the number of votes for the other alternative as given, they have to coordinate on
beating this number of votes. Of course, since the required turnout for each group
2Countries that prohibit publication of exit polls on election day include Germany, United
Kingdom and Norway.
3Such requirements, known as approval quorum requirements, are common in European ref-
erendums. See Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010) for a recent overview of quorum rules in
national referendums in EU countries.
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is endogenous, the general model becomes much more di¢ cult to analyze. Still,
the analysis in this paper can be seen as one step in this direction.
We restrict our analysis of the model to cases where the number of voters
is either two or three. When there are two voters, we consider both the case
where implementation of their commonly preferred alternative requires only one
of them to vote, and the case where it requires both of them to vote. These two-
voter cases are interesting because each of them contains in isolation one of two
collective action issues that are relevant in real world elections. When only one vote
is required there is a free riding problem: Each voter prefers that the other voter
bears the cost of going to the polls. When two votes are needed free riding is not
an issue, but instead there is an obvious coordination problem: Each voter wants
to vote only if the other voter also votes. In our nal case, two out of three voters
need to vote in order for their preferred alternative to be implemented. Thus,
both the free riding issue and the coordination issue are present and therefore the
analysis of this case provides us with important insights that are also likely to be
relevant for real world referendums and elections.
By focusing on a small number of players, we of course avoid the famous para-
dox of not votingformalized by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Our goal here is
solely to provide an analysis of how the publication of an exit poll inuences the
incentive to vote, relative to a situation with no exit poll, not to analyze why
people vote in large elections.4
The introduction of an exit poll inuences potential votersincentive to vote
both before and after the release of the poll. For individuals who have not yet
voted when the exit poll is released, the polls e¤ect on the incentive to cast a late
vote depends crucially on what it reveals. An exit poll that reveals a close race
increases the probability of being pivotal, which stimulates late voting, while an
exit poll revealing that the race is far from close does the opposite. While this is a
rather basic insight, the exit polls e¤ect on the incentive to cast an early vote is
more subtle: Intuitively, voters who face a positive participation cost may nd it
worthwhile to await the result of the poll before they decide whether to abstain or
vote. This wait-and-seee¤ect discourages early voting. But the exit poll may
also give rise to a rst-mover e¤ectthat stimulates early voting: By voting early,
a voter may use the exit poll actively to convince other supporters of the same
alternative that victory is within reach, and this could induce them to participate
in the referendum. As a result, the exit polls e¤ect on the incentive to vote early
is generally ambiguous.
4See Feddersen (2004) for a review of the literature on the paradox of not voting.
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In relation to the debate on the e¤ects of exit polls, the single most important
insight from our analysis is the following: It may well happen that the incentive
to vote increases after the revelation of an exit poll. It may also happen that
this higher incentive is decisive for the outcome of the election, in the sense that
the extra turnout it generates after the release of the poll is su¢ cient to ensure
that voterspreferred alternative is implemented, whereas it would not have been
implemented if voters had continued to behave as they did before the release
of the exit poll. This is essentially the situation that led some commentators,
politicians, and academics to conclude that exit polls changed the outcome of the
2009 Danish referendum. However, our model reveals that this conclusion could
well be wrong. The problem is that it is not based on the correct counterfactual,
which is what would have happened if there had been no exit poll, not what would
have happened if people continued to behave as they did before the exit poll. Since
the exit poll inuences voting behavior before as well as after its release, these two
counterfactuals are not identical. In the context of the Danish referendum, some
of the late voters who showed up at the polls only after the release of the exit poll
may just have postponed voting because of the wait-and-seee¤ect. And thus,
they may well have voted anyway if there had been no exit poll. If so, the outcome
would have been no di¤erent in this case.
Our paper is related to recent theoretical contributions by Goeree and Großer
(2007) and Taylor and Yildirim (2010). Both of these papers focus on the e¤ects
of pre-election public opinion polls in two-candidate majoritarian elections and
reach similar conclusions: Polls stimulate supporters of the alternative favored by
a minority of the population to participate in the election, while individuals who
support the alternative favored by a majority participate less frequently when they
receive information about the distribution of preferences in the population because
they free ride on the participation of other voters who support the same alternative.
The result is that polls lower the probability that the alternative favored by a
majority in the population is implemented. When it comes to expected turnout,
the increase in participation for minority voters more than compensates the lower
participation frequency for majority voters, so total expected turnout goes up,
resulting in higher aggregate participation costs. The combination of higher costs
and a lower probability that the majoritys favored alternative is implemented
leads to the conclusion that polls lower social welfare.5
5The e¤ect of public opinion polls on turnout in the participation games of Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983, 1985) has also been studied experimentally by Klor and Winter (2007) and
Großer and Schram (2010).
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Although related, our paper addresses a di¤erent question than the papers
mentioned above: First of all, we focus on exit polls, rather than pre-election
polls. This is reected in the fact that voters in our model have the opportunity
to vote before the result of the poll is revealed. This makes the game studied
here dynamic, and it opens up for strategic interactions among potential voters
that are absent in the models of pre-election polls. Second, we do not study
purely majoritarian elections. Instead, we focus on elections in which the majority
requirement is supplemented with a requirement on the absolute number of votes
for one of the candidates. Third and nally, uncertainty in our model comes from
imperfect information about other playersvoting costs, while we have assumed
that preferences over alternatives are commonly known (e.g., from pre-election
polls). In the pre-election poll papers mentioned above, it is exactly opposite:
Uncertainty comes from imperfect information about other voterspreferences over
alternatives, while all potential voters are assumed to share a commonly known
participation cost. For the type of elections we wish to study, we believe that our
approach is the appropriate one, as explained above.
Our model is also somewhat related to the theoretical literature on sequen-
tial voting (see, e.g., Battaglini 2004 and the references therein). This literature
analyzes the aggregation of information in exogenously given sequential voting pro-
cedures and compares it with simultaneous voting. Our model is distinct from this
literature on several dimensions. First, the order of voting is endogenous in our
model, since all voters can vote in either period. Furthermore, all voters know their
preferred alternative with certainty, so information aggregation is not an issue.
Throughout this paper, we present our model in the context of elections and
exit polls, but our framework also lends itself to alternative interpretations. The
fact that all agents prefer the same outcome means that we are e¤ectively studying
a game of voluntary private contributions to a threshold public good.6 Such games
have many applications. For example, we could translate voteswith charitable
contributionsin fundraising campaigns where a certain number of contributions
is required for the charity project to be carried out. The question we then ask is
how the expected number of contributions, and the likelihood that the project is
carried out, would change if campaign organizers during the campaign publicized
6A mechanism that provides a binary public if and only if the amount of private contributions
is above a certain threshold is known in the literature as a provision point mechanism (Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989)). In the terminology of this literature, the game studied in this paper is one
of binary contributions, with no refund in case of insu¢ cient contributions, and no rebate in case
of excessive contributions. See Rapoport (1999) for a review of the theoretical and experimental
literatures on these and related types of public good games.
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how many people had contributed so far. Another example is general meetings, in
which attendance is time-consuming and therefore individually costly, but where
general attendance must be above a certain level for resolutions passed in the
meeting to be valid. An exit poll would in this case correspond to a notice from
the organizer revealing how many delegates had committed to showing up so far.
These alternative interpretations of the model are perhaps more suitable in that
the assumption of a small number of players is less restrictive. For consistency, we
shall stick to the terminology of voting and exit polls, however.
2 The Model
We consider an election with two alternatives, A and B. The electoral rules are
such that alternative A is implemented if the number of votes for A is at least
M and higher than the number of votes for B. Otherwise alternative B is imple-
mented. Thus, letting Vz denote the number of votes for alternative z, the outcome
is A if and only if VA  maxfM;VB + 1g. We will only consider the special case
where the number of B supporters in the population is commonly known (e.g.,
from pre-election polls) to be strictly smaller than M . So the behavior of the B
supporters is irrelevant and alternative A is implemented if and only if it receives
at least M votes.
The number of voters who prefer alternative A over alternative B is denoted
N . They all receive a utility of 1 if A is implemented and a utility of 0 if B is
implemented. Each voter i faces a cost ci of participating in the election. The
voting costs are independent and drawn randomly from a common distribution
on R, characterized by a cumulative distribution function F . The realized cost is
private information, so that each voter knows only his own cost. The distribution
function F is known to everyone (common knowledge).
Each voter can either vote early, vote late, or abstain. If there is no exit poll
then no information is revealed during the election and the situation is obviously
equivalent to simultaneous voting. If there is an exit poll then early votes are
revealed before the second stage of voting and this is common knowledge at the
beginning of the game. So we model an exit poll as complete revelation of all early
votes. This is clearly a stylized way of modelling exit polls, but it is a reasonable
starting point. Loosely speaking, by taking this extreme view of the quality of
information revealed by an exit poll, we get results on the upper limit of its
implications.
Each of the set-ups (with or without exit poll) represents a private information
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game and we use standard solution concepts. When there is no exit poll the
game is static, so we use Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. With an exit poll the game
is dynamic and we therefore use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We will restrict
attention to symmetric equilibria, i.e., we assume that all agents use the same
strategy in equilibrium. Furthermore, we will assume that all agents use cut-o¤
strategies. That is, we assume that there is a critical costs level, such that an
agent i abstains if ci exceeds the critical level, and votes if it is below it.7 So in
the simultaneous voting game an equilibrium can simply be described by a single
cut-o¤ cost c. In the exit poll game an equilibrium can be described by a vector
c = (c1; c

2(0); c

2(1); : : : ; c

2(M   1));
where c1 is the cut-o¤ cost in stage one and c

2(n) is the cut-o¤ cost in stage two
if exactly n M   1 agents voted in stage one.
If there is no exit poll then it is easily seen that the cut-o¤ cost c is an equilib-
rium if and only if it is equal to the probability of some voter being pivotal given
that all other voters use the c strategy.8 Thus c is an equilibrium precisely if
c =

N   1
M   1

F (c)M 1(1  F (c))N M : (1)
Then consider the exit poll game. We want to nd the conditions for c to be
an equilibrium. First, suppose we are in stage two and that exactly n  M   1
voters voted in stage one. Agent i can then infer that the remaining N   n   1
potential voters must have costs in excess of the stage one cut-o¤, c1. Then, by
analogy with the no exit poll game, c2(n) must satisfy
c2(n) =

N   n  1
M   n  1

Pr(ci  c2(n)jci > c1)M n 1
(1  Pr(ci  c2(n)jci > c1))N M :
7In each of the specic cases we analyse below, it is straightforward to show that there is in
fact no loss of generality in restricting attention to decision rules of this form.
8To see this, let V  iA denote the number of votes for A, excluding agent is vote. The expected
payo¤ from voting is then Pr(V  iA M 1) ci, while abstaining gives expected payo¤Pr(V  iA 
M). Voting therefore gives weakly higher expected payo¤ than abstaining if and only if ci  c 
Pr(V  iA =M 1). In a symmetric equilibrium all other agents also use the same cut-o¤ strategy,
and the probability that V  iA =M  1 is then equal to the binomial expression on the right-hand
side of (1).
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This is equivalent to c2(n) = 0 or
c2(n) > c

1 and
c2(n) =

N   n  1
M   n  1

(
F (c2(n))  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
)M n 1(
1  F (c2(n))
1  F (c1)
)N M : (2)
The condition that must be satised by the stage one cut-o¤ c1 is more com-
plicated. Consider a voter i and assume that all other voters use the strategy c
and that i himself will use the stage two cut-o¤s from c if he does not vote in
stage one. If i votes in stage one then his expected utility is
Pr(V  iA M   1)  ci;
where V  iA denotes the realized nal number of votes for A from all other voters
than i. His expected utility if he does not vote in stage one is much more complex
because it depends on whether he will vote in stage two which again depends on
the number of stage one votes from all other agents (and of course the expected
utility also depends on the number of stage two votes from other potential voters
not voting in stage one). Therefore, we will not write it out in detail, we simply
note that the two expected utilities must be equal at the cut-o¤ ci = c1. In the
following section we will solve the model in several special cases and in each case
we write down explicitly the equation that determines c1.
3 Analysis
In this section we will solve the model described above when (N;M) = (2; 1),
(2; 2), and (3; 2). In each (N;M)-case we will compare the no exit poll solution to
the exit poll solution. Clearly, the N = 2 cases are extremely simplistic. However,
they are interesting because each of them contains in isolation one of two collective
action issues that are relevant in real world elections. When M = 1 there is a free
riding problem: Each voter (with a positive voting cost) wants alternative A to
be implemented but prefers to stay home while the other person votes. Obviously,
the free riding problem is not present when M = 2. In that case we instead have
a coordination problem: Each voter (with a voting cost below one) wants to vote
if and only if the other person votes as well. Therefore, the N = 2 cases provide
us with valuable insights on the e¤ects of exit polls when only the free riding
problem or only the coordination problem is present. The case of N = 3, M = 2
is the simplest case in which both problems are present. So, even though this case
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is obviously still very simplistic as a model of real world elections, it takes us a
substantial step in the right direction.
As described earlier, the voting cost of each voter is drawn from a common
distribution on the real axis represented by a distribution function F . We will
make some assumptions about the properties of F . First of all we will assume that
F is twice di¤erentiable on [0; 1] with F 0 > 0 and either F 00  0 or F 00  0 on this
interval. The most restrictive of these assumptions is that the second derivative of
F is either non-positive or non-negative. This means that, for example, F cannot
be given by a density function f with mode in (0; 1). Furthermore, we will assume
that F (0) > 0 and F (1) < 1. This means that there is a positive probability that
a given voter will always vote (i.e., that his cost is negative) and also a positive
probability that he wil never vote (i.e., that his cost is above one). All of these
assumptions are made for existence and uniqueness purposes. In some cases they
are substantially stronger than we need, but for simplicity we keep the assumptions
throughout the section.
As an example of a voting cost distribution we will use the uniform distribution
on some interval [ "L; 1 + "H ], where "L; "H > 0. Such a distribution clearly
satises all the assumptions above. Note that we can write F as F (c) = F (0) +
(F (1)   F (0))c for all cs in the support of the distribution. In fact, under the
assumption of a uniform distribution we will treat the values F (0) and F (1) (with
0 < F (0) < F (1) < 1) as parameters. When we do that it is of course important
to remember that by changing F (0) or F (1) we change the support of the uniform
distribution.9 Finally, in the N = 3, M = 2 case we need to assume that F is
given by a uniform distribution to get existence and uniqueness of equilibrium when
there is no exit poll. This is necesssary to get meaningful comparisons between
this situation and the exit poll situation.
3.1 N = 2, M = 1
Equation (1), the equation that must be satised for c to be an equilibrium in the
no exit poll game, is in this case
c = 1  F (c): (3)
9"L and "H can of course be expressed in terms of F (0) and F (1) (and vice versa). By simple
calculations we get
"L =
F (0)
F (1)  F (0) and "H =
1  F (1)
F (1)  F (0) :
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The function 1   F (c) is positive at c = 0, below one at c = 1, and decreasing.
From these observatons it is easily seen that there exists precisely one equilibrium
c which must be in the open interval between zero and one. Note that we can get
this result with much weaker assumptions on F than the ones made above. Table
1 summarizes voter turnout (i.e., the total number of votes given) in the game
with no exit poll for allcombinations of participation costs.
Table 1: Turnout without exit poll when N = 2, M = 1
#Voter 1, !Voter 2 c2  c c < c2
c1  c 2 1
c < c1 1 0
Then consider the exit poll game. First consider stage two when neither voter
voted before the exit poll (otherwise stage two is obviously trivial). For c =
(c1; c

2(0)) to be an equilibrium, c

2(0) must satisfy
c2(0) = 1  Pr(cj  c2(0)jcj > c1):
If c2(0)  c1 then the conditional probability on the right-hand side of this equation
is equal to zero, which means that the equation cannot be satised (under the
assumption that c1 < 1, which is easily seen to be true in any equilibrium, since
F (1) < 1). Thus, we must have c2(0) > c

1 and the equation above can be written
c2(0) = 1 
F (c2(0))  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
;
or
c2(0) =
1  F (c2(0))
1  F (c1)
:
Now consider stage one. We rst claim that in equilibrium we must have
c1  0. Suppose that we had an equilibrium with c1 > 0 and consider a voter
i with ci 2 (0; c1). By denition, he would then vote in stage one. However,
abstaining in stage one would actually ensure him a higher expected payo¤. To
see this, note that if no voters vote in stage one, then voter i would vote in stage
two (since ci < c1 < c

2(0)) and his payo¤ would be the same as if he had voted in
stage one. But if the other voter does in fact vote in stage one (i.e., if his cost is
below c1) then alternative A would be implemented without voter i having to vote,
so his payo¤ would be strictly higher than if he had voted in stage one. From this
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observation we immediately conclude that we cannot have c1 > 0 in equilibrium,
so c = (c1; c

2(0)) must satisfy
c1  0 and c2(0) =
1  F (c2(0))
1  F (c1)
:
A voter with ci  0 will clearly always vote, but is indi¤erent between voting early
and voting late, since it only takes one vote for A to be implemented. However,
by voting early he increases the expected utility of the other voter - he may save
him a costly vote. So if we assume that a voter who is indi¤erent with respect
to his own payo¤ will take the action that maximizes the expected payo¤ of the
other voter then we must have c1 = 0. And then the conditions for c
 to be an
equilibrium become
c1 = 0 and c

2(0) =
1  F (c2(0))
1  F (0) : (4)
It is easy to see that there is a unique c2(0) satisfying (4), and that it must
be in the open interval between zero and one (mimick the argument for existence
and uniqueness of an equilibrium in the no exit poll situation). Furthermore, c2(0)
must be strictly higher than the no exit poll equilibrium cut-o¤, c. To see this,
simply note that, since F (0) > 0, we have 1 F (c)
1 F (0) > 1  F (c) for all c 2 [0; 1], and
thus the function (1 F (c))=(1 F (0)) must intersect the diagonal at a higher cost
than the function 1   F (c).10 The intuition behind this result is straightforward:
Consider the problem facing a voter i in stage two. He can infer that the other
voter does not have a negative voting cost, since he did not vote in stage one.
Thus, for a given cut-o¤ strategy of the other voter, the probability that he votes
is lower than in the no exit poll game. This makes free-riding less attractive and
voter i will therefore vote for higher realizations of ci.
Table 2 summarizes the total number of votes for all combinations of realized
voting costs in the exit poll game.
Table 2: Turnout with exit poll when N = 2, M = 1
#Voter 1, !Voter 2 c2  0 0 < c2  c c < c2  c2(0) c2 > c2(0)
c1  0 2 1 1 1
0 < c1  c 1 2 2 1
c < c1  c2(0) 1 2 2 1
c1 > c2(0) 1 1 1 0
10Even if c1 < 0 we get the same conclusion as long as F (c

1) > 0. However, note that the
closer F (c1) is to zero, the closer is c

2(0) to c.
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Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, we see that there is no general conclusion as to
whether turnout is higher with or without the exit poll. For example, turnout is
always higher with an exit poll when c < c1  c2(0) and c2 > 0, while it is the other
way around when 0 < c1  c and c2  0. However, note that if the realized voting
cost of each candidate is positive then the exit poll always leads to a level of turnout
that is at least as high as without an exit poll and sometimes strictly higher. Also
note that the exit poll situation dominatesthe no exit poll situation with respect
to implementation of alternative A: If A is implemented without an exit poll then
it is also implemented with an exit poll and sometimes it is implemented with
an exit poll but not without it. This does not, however, mean that we have the
same dominance with respect to e¢ ciency (measured by simply aggregating the
utility of the two voters). For some combinations of strictly positive voting costs,
the introduction of an exit poll leads to two votes for A instead of one, which is
obviously ine¢ cient.
So, to sum up our analysis of this case, we have seen that when there is an exit
poll, only voters with non-positive voting costs will vote in stage one. Intuitively,
the anticipation of the exit poll induces potential voters to wait and see: While
there is nothing to lose from voting late rather than early, awaiting the result of
the poll can potentially allow voters to free-ride on other supporters of alternative
A who choose to vote early. Thus, the number of early votes is likely to be lower
when an exit poll is introduced. However, if nobody votes in stage one, then voters
nd free-riding less attractive in stage two, and the number of late votes is then
likely to be higher. These observations lead to the result that the introduction of
an exit poll implies that alternative A is implemented for a strictly larger set of
cost realizations for the two voters. In this sense, an exit poll mitigates the free
riding problem that is the central aspect of this case.
3.2 N =M = 2
This case highlights another collective action problem, namely a coordination prob-
lem: For voters with participation cost between zero and one, voting is preferable
to abstaining if and only if the other voter also participates. A voters probability
of being pivotal in the no exit poll game is now equal to the probability that the
other voter votes. So the condition for c to be an equilibrium is
c = F (c): (5)
Since F (0) > 0, F (1) < 1, and F 0 is either non-increasing or non-decreasing
in the interval [0; 1] (we have assumed that F 00 is either non-negative or non-
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positive), it easily follows that F intersects the diagonal precisely once and that this
intersection happens in (0; 1). Thus we have a unique equilibrium c 2 (0; 1) of the
simultaneous (no exit poll) voting game. Voter turnout for di¤erent combinations
of participation costs are as in Table 1, except that c is now dened as the solution
to equation (5), rather than (3).
Then consider the exit poll game. In stage two, if one of the voters contributed
in stage one then the other voter knows he is pivotal. Thus he will vote if his cost
is not above one, i.e., we have c2(1) = 1. If nobody voted before the exit poll,
then voters in stage two play a game that is very similar the no exit poll game.
The only di¤erence is that each voters belief about the cost of the other voter is
di¤erent, because he can infer from the stage one actions that it must be above c1.
So c2(0) must satisfy
c2(0) = Pr(c
j  c2(0)jcj > c1);
which is equivalent to
c2(0) =
Pr(c1 < c
j  c2(0))
Pr(c1 > cj)
;
or
c2(0) = maxf0;
F (c2(0))  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
g: (6)
Now consider stage one. Voter is payo¤ from voting in this stage is (let j
denote the other voter)
1  Pr(cj > 1)  ci:
His payo¤ from not voting early is (assuming that j follows the strategy c and
that i follows c in stage two)
1  Pr(cj > maxfc1; c2(0)g)  ci if ci  c2(0)
Pr(cj  c1)(1  ci) if c2(0) < ci  1
0 if ci > 1
It is easily seen that in any equilibrium we must have c1; c

2(0) < 1 (since F (1) < 1).
And then it immediately follows from the expressions above that voting early
dominates not voting early for voter i if ci  c2(0). That is, if ci  c2(0), then it
must also be true that ci  c1. This means that we must have c1  c2(0), and it
then follows from equation (6) that c2(0) = 0. So we have that, in equilibrium, if
neither voter votes in stage one then they will also not vote in stage two. We also
see that the equilibrium condition for c1 is
1  c1   Pr(cj > 1) = Pr(cj  c1)(1  c1);
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which is equivalent to
F (1)  c1 = F (c1)(1  c1):
Solving this equation we get
c1 =
F (1)  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
:
So, summing up, c = (c1; c

2(0); c

2(1)) is an equilibrium if and only if
c1 =
F (1)  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
, c2(0) = 0, and c

2(1) = 1:
By standard arguments we see that there is a unique solution c1 2 (0; 1) to the
rst equation, so there is a unique equilibrium in the exit poll game.
Our next step is to compare the outcome of the exit poll situation with the
outcome when there is no exit poll. We split the analysis into two cases: c1  c
and c1 < c. We shall later present a condition on F that determines which of the
two cases that is relevant.
First, consider the case c1  c. Voter turnout as a function of the realized costs
of the voters (c1 and c2) is summarized in Table 3. To ease comparisons with the
game without an exit poll, we illustrate the corresponding voter turnouts in this
game in Table 4.
Table 3: Turnout with exit poll when N =M = 2 and c1  c
#Agent 1, !Agent 2 c2  c c < c2  c1 c1 < c2  1 c2 > 1
c1  c 2 2 2 1
c < c1  c1 2 2 2 1
c1 < c
1  1 2 2 0 0
c1 > 1 1 1 0 0
Table 4: Turnout without exit poll when N =M = 2 and c1  c
#Agent 1, !Agent 2 c2  c c < c2  c1 c1 < c2  1 c2 > 1
c1  c 2 1 1 1
c < c1  c1 1 0 0 0
c1 < c
1  1 1 0 0 0
c1 > 1 1 0 0 0
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The tables illustrate that with an exit poll the turnout is always at least as
high as when there is no exit poll and often higher. It is also easy to see that we
have an analogous domination result with respect to the implementation of A: If
A is implemented without an exit poll, then it is also implemented with an exit
poll and there are many combinations of costs such that it is implemented with an
exit poll but not without it. Also note that we have domination in the opposite
direction, no exit poll dominates exit poll, with respect to the outcome that no
votes are cast.
Finally, the tables show that the exit poll improves e¢ ciency (aggregate utility)
for many cost combinations. However, if c1 > 1 and c < c2  c1, and in the
symmetric situation where c2 > 1 and c < c1  c1, the exit poll leads to lower
e¤ciency (one instead of zero votes). So there is no domination result with respect
to e¢ ciency.
Then consider the case c1 < c. Voter turnout for all combinations of partici-
pation costs is summarized in Table 5, For each combination, the corresponding
turnout in the game with no exit poll is shown in Table 6.
Table 5: Turnout with an exit poll when N =M = 2 and c1 < c
#Agent 1, !Agent 2 c2  c1 c1 < c2  c c < c2  1 c2 > 1
c1  c1 2 2 2 1
c1 < c
1  c 2 0 0 0
c < c1  1 2 0 0 0
c1 > 1 1 0 0 0
Table 6: Turnout without an exit poll when N =M = 2 and c1 < c
#Agent 1, !Agent 2 c2  c1 c1 < c2  c c < c2  1 c2 > 1
c1  c1 2 2 1 1
c1 < c
1  c 2 2 1 1
c < c1  1 1 1 0 0
c1 > 1 1 1 0 0
In this case we have that for some combinations of costs the exit polls leads
to higher turnout, for other combinations it is the other way around. So there is
no domination result with respect to turnout. The same is true with respect to
implementation of A and e¢ ciency. However, it is easy to see that, with the exit
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poll, the set of combinations of positive costs for which exactly one voter votes
is smaller than if there was no exit poll. So in this sense the introduction of an
exit poll leads to a decrease in "wasteful voting", which is at the heart of the
coordination problem that this simple case highlights.
As is clear from the analysis above, the conclusions about the e¤ects of an
exit poll in this case is highly dependent on whether c1  c or c1 < c. If the
rst inequality holds then an exit poll has an unambiguous positive e¤ect on the
level of turnout and the implementation of A. If the second inequality holds then
the e¤ect of an exit poll on turnout and implementation of A are ambiguous, i.e.,
positive for some combinations of realized voting costs and negative for others.
Therefore, it is important to nd out when we have c1  c and when it is the
opposite inequality that holds.
We rst show the following lemma.
Lemma 1
c1 T c () c S 1 
p
1  F (1):
Proof. See the appendix.
Suppose that the distribution of voting costs is uniform on some interval containing
[0; 1] such that we can write F (c) = F (0) + (F (1)   F (0))c for c 2 [0; 1]. Then,
using the lemma above, we immediately get a condition on F (0) and F (1) which
determines whether c1  c or c1 < c. Because with the uniform distribution a
straightforward calculation shows that
c =
F (0)
1  (F (1)  F (0)) :
And then, by a bit of algebra, we see that c S 1 p1  F (1) is equivalent to
F (0) S (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1)):
Finally, note that if F 00 > 0 (on [0; 1]) then F must intersect the diagonal at a
lower cost than if we had a uniform distribution with the same F (0) and F (1)
values (as illustrated in Figure 1 below), which means that c must be lower when
F 00 > 0 than when F 00 = 0. It then follows from the arguments above and Lemma
1 that if
F 00  0 and F (0)  (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
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then we have c1  c. Analogously, if
F 00  0 and F (0) > (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
then we have c1 < c.
Figure 1: c when F 00 < 0, F 00 = 0 and F 00 > 0
We sum up our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (The e¤ects of an exit poll when N =M = 2)
1. If the distribution function F satises
F 00  0 (on [0; 1]) and F (0)  (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
then the equilibrium period one cut-o¤ cost in the exit poll game will be
equal to or greater than the equilibrium cut-o¤ cost in the no exit poll game
(c1  c). This implies that an exit poll has unambiguous positive e¤ects on
the level of turnout and the implementation of A.
2. If the distribution function F satises
F 00  0 (on [0; 1]) and F (0) > (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
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then the equilibrium period one cut-o¤ cost in the exit poll game will be lower
than the equilibrium cut-o¤ cost in the no exit poll game (c1 < c). This
implies that an exit poll does not have an unambiguous e¤ect on the level of
turnout or the implementation of A (for some combinations of realized voting
costs the e¤ect is positive, for others it is negative). However, an exit poll
has an unambiguous negative e¤ect on "wasteful voting", i.e., there are fewer
combinations of positive voting costs such that precisely one voter votes.
Let us explore some of the intuition behind the results above. For simplicity,
assume that F 00 = 0, i.e., consider a uniform distribution of voting costs. We are
especially interested in why c1  c if F (0) is su¢ ciently low, while we have the
opposite inequality when it is not. Therefore, we hold F (1) xed. This of course
means that a change in F (0) corresponds to a change in both the upper and lower
limit of the support of the uniform cost distribution.
An exit poll inuences a voters incentive to vote early in two ways. First, the
exit poll gives rise to a rst-mover e¤ect, which stimulates early voting: If agent
i votes early then he might induce the other voter to vote as well. Intuitively, if the
other player observes that player i voted in stage one, he will know with certainty
that he is pivotal in stage two, which makes voting more attractive. Second,
the exit poll produces a wait-and-see e¤ectthat discourages early voting. This
e¤ect parallels the wait-and-see e¤ect from the N = 2, M = 1 case studied in the
previous section, but now the incentive to wait and see comes from a desire to
avoid casting a costly but useless vote, and not from a desire to free-ride on the
other voter. If he abstains in stage one, voter i will choose to vote late if and only
if his vote is pivotal, i.e., if and only if the other agent voted early.
How does the size of F (0) a¤ect the relative strengths of these two opposite
e¤ects? As F (0) gets larger it becomes less likely that the rst-mover e¤ect from an
early vote will kick in. This is because, for any c 2 (0; 1), the probability that the
other voter has a cost in the interval (c; 1) becomes lower. Therefore, it becomes
less likely that an early vote from agent i will make another agent switch from
abstention to late participation. On the other hand, an increase in F (0) makes it
more attractive to wait and see in stage one, since the probability that the other
voter votes early is now higher. In total, these observations imply that as F (0)
rises, not voting in stage one becomes relatively more attractive than voting. And
that explains the role of F (0) in the results in the proposition.
The role of 1   F (1) in the results is more subtle. An increase in 1   F (1)
(we now hold F (0) xed) makes it less likely that an early vote will make the
other voter vote in stage two, thus weakening the rst-mover e¤ect. But the
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e¤ect on the attractiveness of waiting is also negative because it becomes less
likely that the other voter will vote early. Thus, the relative e¤ect of a change
in 1   F (1) cannot be determined from these intuitive arguments. And indeed,
it follows from the proposition that the e¤ect can go both ways, the expression
(
p
1  F (1))(1 p1  F (1)) is not monotone with respect to 1  F (1).
We end the analysis of this case by considering the simple example where the
cost distribution is given by the uniform distribution on [ "; 1+ "] for some " > 0.
Thus we assume that the probability that a voter will always vote is the same as
the probability that he will never vote: F (0) = 1 F (1). In this case the condition
F (0)  (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
is equivalent to
F (0) = 1  F (1)  1
4
.
So with this type of cost distribution we have that c1  c, and thus that an exit
poll has an unambiguous positive e¤ect on turnout and the implementation of A,
if and only if there is at least a fty percent chance that a given voter has a voting
cost between zero and one.
3.3 N = 3, M = 2
Our nal analysis combines the insights from the previous two analyses. With
three potential voters and two votes required for implementation, the free riding
problem and the coordination problem are both relevant. A voter is now pivotal
if precisely one of the other two agents votes. Thus c is an equilibrium in the no
exit poll game if and only if
c = 2F (c)(1  F (c)):
As mentioned earlier, we will in this case assume that the distribution of voting
costs is given by a uniform distribution on some interval containing [0; 1]. So we
have F (c) = F (0) + (F (1)   F (0))c for all cs in the support of the distribution.
It is easy to see that, with this assumption, the function on the right hand side of
the equilibrium equation above becomes a second order polynomial with negative
second derivative. Furthermore, note that the polynomial (we simply refer to
the variable as c) is positive at c = 0 and that its maximum value is 1
2
. From
these observations it follows easily that there is precisely one equilibrium c which
must be in the open interval between zero and one. It is straightforward to solve
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explicitly for the equilibrium, we simply have to nd the largest root of a second
order polynomial. The explicit solution, which is of course a function of F (0) and
F (1), can be found in the appendix.
Then consider the exit poll game. In this game an equilibrium is written
c = (c1; c

2(0); c

2(1)). The following proposition establishes that there always
exists an equilibrium. Note that our assumption about a uniform cost distribution
is not necessary for these results to hold, only our general assumptions about the
cost distribution are used in the proof.
Proposition 3 (Existence of exit poll equilibrium when N = 3, M = 2)
Let c1; c

2(1) 2 (0; 1). Then c = (c1; 0; c2(1)) is an equilibrium of the exit poll game
if and only if the following two equations are satised:
c1 =
(1  F (c1))2   (1  F (c2(1)))2
F (c1)2 + (1  F (c1))2
and
c2(1) =
1  F (c2(1))
1  F (c1)
:
There exists a solution c1; c

2(1) (with c

1; c

2(1) 2 (0; 1)) to this pair of equations.
All solutions satisfy c1; c < c

2(1).
Proof. See the appendix.
If we have an equilibrium of the exit poll game with c1  c then it is easy
to check that the turnout will always be at least as high as in the no exit poll
equilibrium and sometimes higher. Furthermore, it is also easy to check that we
have the same domination result with respect to implementation of A. On the
other hand, if we have an equilibrium with c1 < c and c

2(0) = 0 then there are
cost realizations such that the turnout is zero in this equilibrium while it is at
least two without an exit poll. For example, consider a combination of costs where
ci 2 (c1; c) for all voters i. Then nobody will vote in the exit poll equilibrium while
all voters would vote if there were no exit poll. In Proposition 4 we nd a condition
that guarantees the existence of an exit poll equilibrium that dominates the no
exit poll equilibrium with respect to turnout and implementation of A. When
this condition is not satised, then there exists an exit poll equilibrium with zero
turnout for some cost realizations that would give a turnout of at least two if there
were no exit poll. Finally, we also show that in any exit poll equilibrium there
are cost realizations such that the turnout is at least two while it would be zero
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without an exit poll. So the no exit poll equilibrium cannot dominate an exit poll
equilibrium with respect to turnout or implementation of A. Note that this holds
for all equilibria of the exit poll game, not only equilibria with c2(0) = 0.
For the proposition we need the following denition. Let c
¯2
(c) 2 (0; 1) be the
unique number given by the equation
c
¯2
(c) =
1  F (c
¯2
(c))
1  F (c) :
This is the equation for the cut-o¤ strategy c
¯2
(c) to be optimal in stage two after
one vote in stage one, given that all voters used the cut-o¤ strategy c in stage one
and that the other remaining voter also uses the c
¯2
(c) strategy in stage two.
Proposition 4 (The e¤ects of an exit poll when N = 3, M = 2)
1. Suppose the following condition is satised:
(1  F (c))2   (1  F (c
¯ 2
(c)))2  c(1  c):
Then there exists an equilibrium of the exit poll game with c1  c (and
c2(0) = 0), i.e., an equilibrium that dominates the no exit poll equilibrium
with respect to both turnout and implementation of A.
2. Suppose that the condition from part one is not satised, i.e., that
(1  F (c))2   (1  F (c
¯ 2
(c)))2 < c(1  c):
Then there exists an equilibrium of the exit poll game with c1 < c (and
c2(0) = 0). For such an equilibrium there are cost realizations such that
turnout is zero while it would be at least two if there were no exit poll.
3. For any equilibrium of the exit poll game there exist cost realizations such
that the turnout is at least two while it would be at most one if there were no
exit poll.
Proof. See the appendix.
Because of our assumption about uniform distribution of voting costs it is
straightforward to explicitly write c
¯2
(c) as a function of c:
c
¯2
(c) =
1  F (0)
1  F (0) + (F (1)  F (0))(1  c) :
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And thus, given that we have already found an explicit expression for c in terms of
F (0) and F (1) we can in principle write the conditions from part one and two of
Proposition 4 as conditions on F (0) and F (1). However, the expressions on either
side of the inequalities are complicated and it seems impossible to analytically
derive insights from them. So instead we nummerically calculate each side of the
inequalities. And then, treating F (0) and 1 F (1) as parameters, we plot whether
it is the condition from part one or the condition from part two that holds. Note
that we use 1 F (1) instead of F (1) as a parameter because then our parameters
are, respectively, the probability that a voter will always vote and the probability
that a voter will never vote. For any feasible combination of F (0) and 1   F (1),
gure 2 below illustrates which of the inequalities in Proposition 4 is satised.
Figure 2: The e¤ects of an exit poll when N = 3, M = 2
We see that if the probability that a voter will always vote is above (roughly) ten
percent then the condition from part two of the proposition is satised no matter
what the probability that a voter will never vote is. Similarly, if the probability
that a voter will never vote is below (roughly) thirty percent then it is also the
case that the condition from part two is satised (no matter what the value of
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F (0) is). So in a large region of the F (0); 1   F (1) parameter space we can only
conclude that the introduction of an exit poll can have both positive and negative
e¤ects on turnout and the implementation of A. The sign of the e¤ect depends on
the realizations of voting costs. Only in a much smaller subset of the parameter
space - in which F (0) is below ten percent and 1   F (1) is above thirty percent
- can we guarantee the existence of an equilibrium such that the introduction of
an exit poll has an unambiguous positive e¤ect on the level of turnout and the
implementation of A.
The intuition behind these results is similar to the one explained in the case
of N = M = 2. A larger value of F (0) means that there is a higher probability
that the other players will vote early (not because of strategic considerations, but
for example because they enjoy fullling their civic duty). This makes it more
attractive for a player with a positive participation cost to await the result of the
exit poll before going to the polls, since this may allow her to free-ride on the
other players, or at least avoid wasting a costly vote on a losing candidate. As
a result, the incentive to vote early falls. When F (0) becomes su¢ ently large,
we can therefore guarantee the existence of an equilibrium such that the exit poll
lowers the incentive to vote early (c1 < c), and the number of voters participating
may be lower than if there had been no poll.
We end our analysis with an important example. Suppose that the parameters
F (0) and 1   F (1) are such that the inequality in part two of proposition 4 is
satised (the light grey shaded area in Figure 2). We then know that there exists
an equilibrium with c1 < c < c

2(1) and c

2(0) = 0. Assume that the three voters
face cost realizations such that c1  c1, c2 2 (c1; c), and c3 > c2(1). With this
combination of costs, voter 1 will vote early, voter 2 will vote late, and voter 3 will
abstain. Alternative A is therefore implemented with a minimal margin of victory.
To the casual observer, this outcome may suggest the following interpretation:
The release of the exit poll raised the incentive to vote (since c2(1) > c

1). This led
player 2, whose vote was pivotal to the outcome of the election, to cast a late vote.
Without the exit poll, alternative A would therefore not have been implemented.
This interpretation is wrong. In the absence of an exit poll, voter 1 and voter 2
would both have voted (since c1; c2 < c) and the outcome of the election would in
fact have been the same. The problem with the erroneous interpretation is that it
presupposes that voter 2s behavior before the release of the poll is indicative of
how she would have behaved if there were no exit poll. In doing so, it ignores that
it is in fact the exit poll itself that, through the wait-and-see e¤ect, causes voter 2
to abstain in stage one.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has studied the impact of exit polls in elections with two alternatives,
where the alternative favored by a majority in the population must receive a certain
number of votes in order to win. We have shown that the introduction of an exit
poll inuences the incentive to vote both before and after the results of the poll are
released. Before the exit poll is released, potential voters may nd it worthwhile to
await its result before they decide on whether to stay home or go to the polls. That
way, they may hope to free ride on other voters who support the same alternative,
or they may avoid wasting time and e¤ort on participating in the election if their
preferred alternative is bound to lose anyway. This e¤ect thus discourages early
voting. On the other hand, supporters of the alternative favored by a majority
may also use the exit poll actively to coordinate their e¤orts: By inuencing the
result of the exit poll, early voters can induce fellow supporters to vote after the
result of the poll is revealed, and this may stimulate early voting. In sum, the
total e¤ect of an exit poll on the incentive to vote early is ambiguous. Once the
results of the exit poll is released, the e¤ect on remaining potential votersincentive
to participate depends on the information revealed by the poll. Voting becomes
more attractive if the poll reveals a close race, but less attractive if it reveals the
opposite. As a result of these opposite e¤ects, we nd that an exit polls e¤ect on
voter turnout and election outcomes is ambiguous.
Much of the skepticism towards exit polls comes from the belief that such polls
may change the outcome of the election, a possibility that some commentators
consider undemocratic. While we certainly agree that exit polls have the poten-
tial to change election outcomes, we also believe that the empirical case for this
hypothesis is sometimes overstated. This was for example the case, we believe, in
the debate following the Danish referendum in June 2009. The problem with this
debate was that it did not recognize the possibility that voter behavior was inu-
enced by exit polls not only after, but also before the release of the rst exit poll
result. Hence, the low turnout before the release of the rst poll was interpreted
as an indicator for what would have happened later in the day, had the results of
the exit poll not been published. In reality, however, the low early turnout itself
could very well be a direct consequence of the exit poll if voters postponed voting
until after the results of the poll were revealed.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
First note that the functions F (c) and F (1) F (c)
1 F (c) intersects at precisely one cost
c 2 (0; 1). By solving a second order equation we get that F (c) = 1 p1  F (1).
Now suppose that c1 > c. Since
F (1) F (c)
1 F (c) is decreasing and F (c) is increasing
this is equivalent to these two functions intersecting below the 45 line, which is
obviously equivalent to F (c) < c. Further, since F is increasing and intersects the
diagonal precisely once, this is equivalent to
c = F (c) < F (c) = 1 
p
1  F (1):
Thus we have shown that
c1 > c () c < 1 
p
1  F (1):
The arguments showing that
c1 = c () c = 1 
p
1  F (1)
and
c1 < c () c > 1 
p
1  F (1)
are completely analogous. 
Equilibrium in the no exit poll game when N = 3, M = 2.
CLAIM: In the N = 3, M = 2 case (where we assume that the cost distribution
is uniform), the unique equilibrium of the no exit poll game is
c =
2(F (1)  F (0))(1  2F (0))  1
4(F (1)  F (0))2
+
p
(2(F (1)  F (0))  1)2 + 8F (0)(F (1)  F (0))
4(F (1)  F (0))2 :
Proof. Remember that the equilibrium condition is
c = 2F (c)(1  F (c)):
27
Since the cost distribution is uniform we have F (c) = F (0) + (F (1)  F (0))c (for
cs in the support of the distribution) and thus the equilibrium condition becomes
c = 2(F (0) + (F (1)  F (0))c)(1  F (0)  (F (1)  F (0))c);
which, by straightforward calculations, becomes
2(F (1)  F (0))2c2
+ (4F (0)(F (1)  F (0))  2(F (1)  F (0)) + 1)c
  2F (0)(1  F (0)) = 0:
The equilibrium is the positive solution to this second order equation. By solving
for this solution we get the expression from the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, suppose c = (c1; 0; c

2(1)) is an equilibrium of the exit poll game such that
c1; c

2(1) 2 (0; 1). It is easy to see that then we must have
c2(1) = Pr(c
j > c2(1)jcj > c1).
If c2(1)  c1 the probability on the right-hand side of this expression is equal to
1. But since c2(1) < 1 we must then have
c2(1) > c

1 and c

2(1) =
1  F (c2(1))
1  F (c1)
:
To get the equation for c1, rst note that if some voter i votes in stage one then
his expected payo¤ is
1  Pr(cj > c2(1))2   ci = 1  (1  F (c2(1)))2   ci
= F (c2(1))(2  F (c2(1))  ci:
If 0 < ci  c2(1) then his payo¤ from not voting in stage one is11
Pr(cj  c1)2 + 2Pr(cj  c1)(1  Pr(cj  c1))(1  ci)
= F (c1)
2 + 2F (c1)(1  F (c1))(1  ci):
11If ci > c2(1) it is
Pr(cj  c2(1))2
and if ci  0 it is
Pr(cj  c1)2 + 2Pr(cj  c1)(1  Pr(cj  c1))  ci:
But since we already know that c2(1) > c

1 > 0 we do not need to consider these cases.
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Thus c1 must satisy
F (c2(1))(2  F (c2(1))  c1 = F (c1)2 + 2F (c1)(1  F (c1))(1  c1):
This equation is easily seen to be equivalent to
c1 =
F (c2(1))(2  F (c2(1))  F (c1)(2  F (c1))
1  2F (c1)(1  F (c1))
:
From this equation we easily get the equation from the proposition.
Then suppose that we have c1; c

2(1) 2 (0; 1) such that the equations are satised
(note that the equation for c1 implies that c

1 < c

2(1)) . Consider the strategy
c = (c1; 0; c

2(1)). From the arguments above it easily follows that c

1 and c

2(1) are
optimal cut-o¤ costs at the history in the game where they are used, given that
the other voters use c (and, of course, given that beliefs are updated correctly
in stage two). Also, since c1 > 0, it is easy to see that c

2(0) = 0 is optimal in
stage two if there is no early votes. So when the equations from the proposition
are satised, c = (c1; 0; c

2(1)) is indeed an equilibrium.
Next, we will show that we always have existence of a solution c1; c

2(1) 2 (0; 1)
to the equations. First, for each c1 2 [0; 1] let c¯2(c1) be the unique solution to theequation
c
¯2
(c1) =
1  F (c
¯2
(c1))
1  F (c1) :
Then c
¯2
is a continuous function of c1 on [0; 1] and we have c¯2
(c1) > c1 for all
c1 2 [0; 1) (note that c¯2(1) = 1).Now consider the equation
c1 =
(1  F (c1))2   (1  F (c¯2(c

1)))
2
F (c1)2 + (1  F (c1))2
:
The right hand side of this equation (considered as a function of c1 2 [0; 1]) is
positive at c1 = 0, zero at c

1 = 1, and continuous. Thus it must intersect the
diagonal at least once between zero and one, so we have at least one solution in
(0; 1) to this equation. Pick a solution c1 and let c

2(1) =c¯2
(c1). Then we have a
solution to the equations from the proposition and the solution obviously satises
c1 < c

2(1).
Finally, it remains to be shown that c2(1) > c. Since c = 2F (c)(1 F (c))  12 ,
it su¢ ces to show that c2(1) >
1
2
. We have that c2(1) satises
c2(1) =
1  F (c2(1))
1  F (c1)
:
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Thus c2(1) is given as the intersection between the function
1  F ()
1  F (c1)
and the diagonal. This function is a straight line (because F is linear) with a
negative slope, is above one at zero, and above zero at one. So it is easy to see
that its intersection with the diagonal must happen at a cost above one half. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
1: Since c = 2F (c)(1   F (c)) = 1   F (c)2 + (1   F (c))2, the inequality can be
rewritten as
c  (1  F (c))
2   (1  F (c
¯2
(c)))2
F (c)2 + (1  F (c))2 :
Consider, for a moment, the right hand side as a function on [0; 1]. At one it is
equal to zero and thus below the diagonal so (because of continuity) there must
exist a c1 2 [c; 1) with
c1 =
(1  F (c1))2   (1  F (c¯2(c

1)))
2
F (c1)2 + (1  F (c1))2
:
And thus (see Proposition 3 and its proof) we have an exit poll equilibrium with
c1  c (and c2(0) = 0).
2: Analogously to above, it follows from the inequality in the proposition that there
exists a c1 2 (0; c) such that
c1 =
(1  F (c1))2   (1  F (c¯2(c

1)))
2
F (c1)2 + (1  F (c1))2
:
And thus we have an exit poll equilibrium with c1 < c (and c

2(0) = 0).
3: Suppose c = (c1; c

2(0); c

2(1)) is an exit poll equilibrium. Analogously to the
proof of proposition 3 it can be shown that c2(1) > c. Any cost realization satis-
fying, for example, c1 < c1, c < c
2  c2(1), and c3 > 1 would result in two votes
if there is an exit poll and at most one vote if there is not (one if c1  c, zero if
c1 > c). 
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